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Evaluating the Effect of Domestic Support on International Trade: A 
Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Approach 
Kirsten Urban, Martina Brockmeier and Hans G. Jensen  
Abstract:  
We use the Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Index (MTRI) to develop an extended index that 
measures the overall trade effects of domestic support payments in a general equilibrium frame-
work environment. Our index is capable of analyzing the development of the trade restrictive-
ness of domestic support payments over time and across countries and of comparing these pay-
ments with other protection instruments. Furthermore, our index helps evaluate agricultural 
policy reforms that introduce changes into the composition of domestic support payments. We 
conduct this analysis with an extended version of the GTAP model and database using the EU 
as an example. Thus, we incorporate detailed EU domestic support payments taken from the 
OECD Producer Support Estimate (PSE) tables in the GTAP framework and reconcile PSE data 
with the WTO classification scheme. Although our index slightly increases from 2004 to 2007, 
the results indicate a decrease in trade distortion stemming from the implementation of decou-
pled support in the EU. The trade-equivalent protection rate determined under the index shows 
that domestic support payments restrict trade more than tariffs and export subsidies. Addition-
ally, the index indicates that reducing WTO amber box domestic support payments would lead 
to decreased trade restrictiveness. 
Keywords: domestic distortions, agricultural policies, trade restrictiveness, simulation models 
JEL classification: D58, F13, F14, Q17, Q18 
1 Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed an ongoing debate regarding the trade-distorting effects of domes-
tic support in agriculture. Typically, domestic support is based on a variety of different and 
country-specific agricultural policy instruments, which makes the impact on trade difficult to 
address. The importance of such payments has grown as the more detailed reduction require-
ments for domestic support from the Doha Round have been implemented. As a consequence, 
  
2 
 
several countries have initiated reforms of their agricultural policies to meet WTO criteria. New 
instruments have been developed to reduce production-distorting incentives of such payments, 
such as the Single Farm Payment (SFP) in the EU. Nevertheless, these new instruments, includ-
ing the SFP, are controversial because payments decoupled from production may still create 
incentives to produce based on other coupling channels, including uncertainty, imperfect credit 
 (Bhaskar and 
Beghin 2009). Thus, the trade-distorting effects of decoupled domestic support remain unclear. 
Over the years, two prevailing sets of indicators have been developed to provide information 
regarding domestic support in the agricultural sector, and these indicators have become ac-
cepted worldwide. One of these indicators is the Producer Support Estimate (PSE) from the 
OECD, which has been calculated since 1986 and is typically accompanied by several other 
composite measures, such as the Percentage PSE (%PSE), the Nominal Rate of Assistance 
(NRA) and the Effective Rate of Assistance (ERA). The aim of the OECD in using the PSE is 
to quantify the effects of national distortions consistently and to establish a common basis for 
a policy dialogue among countries (OECD 2010). Beginning from the same basis as the PSE, 
the WTO established the Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) concurrently with its am-
ber, blue, and green box subsidy classification scheme in the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) 
(WTO 1994). In the Doha Round, the WTO introduced an additional criterion, the overall base 
level of all trade-distorting domestic support (OTDS) (WTO 2004), to compare the amount of 
domestic support between countries and to facilitate the negotiation of commitments to reduc-
ing domestic support.  
Indicators such as the PSE can be classified as traditional weighted aggregates of price dis-
tortions and are thus not appropriate for analyzing the trade restrictiveness or economic welfare 
losses associated with policies (Anderson and Croser 2011). However, aggregation problems 
persist in quantifying domestic distortions and in other areas. Anderson and Neary (2003) point 
to the lack of a theoretical foundation in criticizing measures such as arithmetic or trade-
weighted average tariffs, non-tariff barrier coverage ratios and measures of tariff dispersion that 
are frequently used to compare international trade polices over time and across countries. None-
theless, researchers have developed several theoretically sound aggregation procedures to over-
come the aggregation problems that arise from different types and variations of policies across 
sectors and regions. The general objective is to produce a single index that captures the overall 
effects of different policy instruments using a consistent theoretical aggregation method. This 
index should be capable of evaluating trade policies across policy measures, sectors, regions 
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and, in particular, over time. Initial and influential theoretical work in this area has been pub-
lished by Corden (1966), Feenstra (1995) and, in particular, by Anderson and Neary (1994; 
2003; 2005), who developed two theory-based indexes, the Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) 
and the Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Index (MTRI).  
Several studies apply and further develop the concepts of the TRI and MTRI for tariff anal-
ysis in a partial or general equilibrium environment (Pelikan and Brockmeier 2008a; 2008b; 
Bureau and Salvatici 2005; Antimiani and Salvatici 2005; Kee et al. 2009). However, the liter-
ature on the adjustments and applications that measure the impact of domestic support payments 
remains scarce. The exceptions in the literature include Anderson, Bannister and Neary (1995) 
and Anderson and Neary (2005), who adjust their TRI concept to account for factor market 
distortions and thereby generate an index that consistently quantifies the effects of domestic 
distortions on welfare. With respect to the MTRI, Anderson and Neary (2005) provide a rough 
adjustment to cover domestic distortions, but there have been no applications as of yet to vali-
date this methodology. Salvatici (2001) extends the TRI approach to evaluate the EU common 
agricultural policy by using an adjusted version of the GTAP model that includes modifications 
in the computation of equivalent variation. Also building on the TRI and MTRI, Anderson and 
Croser (2011), Croser and Anderson (2011), Croser et al. (2010), and Lloyd and MacLaren 
(2010) offer a methodological approach that is restricted to a partial equilibrium environment 
and estimates the relative contribution of different agricultural policy instruments to the overall 
odology to generate time series of indexes for agricultural products that can be used to evaluate 
national policy development and make cross-country comparisons. One caveat regarding their 
approach is that the estimated indexes include neither non-product-specific domestic support 
payments as input subsidies not distributed at the product level nor, in particular, decoupled 
support. Lloyd and MacLaren (2010) contend that partial equilibrium estimates underestimate 
the true value of the indexes due to the neglect of general equilibrium effects. To overcome this 
bias, they apply semi general equilibrium measures that account for input-output relationships. 
Although research has addressed certain domestic support issues, other important questions 
remain unanswered. How harmful is agricultural domestic support for international trade? Are 
domestic subsidies even more restrictive than tariffs? Has the introduction of decoupled sup-
port, such as the EU's SFP, decreased the magnitude of this effect? Additionally, country-spe-
cific domestic support typically consists of different categories and types of payments. Conse-
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quently, an evaluation tool is required that compares the trade restrictiveness of different poli-
cies according to the type and classification of support across countries and that evaluates their 
development over time. Furthermore, the WTO modalities paper defines commitments to re-
duce the OTDS and places reduction requirements on the AMS and blue box subsidies. How-
ever, most global equilibrium models evaluate the level of domestic support through the OECD 
PSE. Employing global equilibrium models in the analysis of domestic support reduction, as 
suggested in the WTO negotiations, requires the WTO amber, blue and green box support clas-
sification scheme and the PSE data to be reconciled. 
Against this backdrop, our objective is to provide a theoretically based index to evaluate 
different domestic support payment categories and types over time and across countries that 
can also serve as an evaluation tool for WTO criteria. In addition, this index should enable us 
to compare the trade restrictiveness of domestic support, import tariffs, and other protection 
instruments. To the best of our knowledge, this type of index is not currently available in the 
literature. Thus, this research contributes to filling the gap of applied analyses measuring the 
trade restrictiveness of domestic distortions. 
Specifically, this study extends the standard GTAP framework to incorporate detailed do-
mestic support categories and payment types. Furthermore, we match the OECD PSE data in 
the underlying GTAP database with the WTO amber, blue, and green box support classification 
scheme to reconcile the representations of both important measures of domestic support pay-
ments and then integrate them into the GTAP model. We also respond to the question of how 
this extended GTAP framework can be utilized to calculate domestic support indexes. For this 
purpose, we build on the work of Anderson and Neary (2005) and Lloyd and MacLaren (2010) 
and introduce an adaptation of the MTRI that is adjusted to account for domestic distortions 
into the GTAP model. The methodological approach introduced in this article extends the stand-
ard computable general equilibrium (CGE) analyses of international trade liberalization and 
country-specific policy reforms by employing a CGE model that accurately covers domestic 
support payments and the corresponding trade restrictiveness using a theoretically sound index. 
This article is organized as follows. In section 2, we explain how we adapted the MTRI to 
measure the tariff equivalent of domestic support payments, which is followed by a description 
of the extended GTAP modeling framework in section 3. Section 4 introduces the experiment 
design and simulation results. The closing section discusses our findings, offers political con-
clusions, and suggests directions for future research.  
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2 Existing indicators of domestic distortions for the EU 
The EU agricultural sector is heavily subsidized. The starting point of the common agricultural 
policy (CAP) of the EU consisted of policy instruments, such as intervention prices and output 
subsidies, that primarily created production incentives. Such policies enhanced EU agricultural 
production on the domestic market, led to oversupplies on the world market, and replaced im-
ports. The EU substantially modified the CAP to address its impact and to meet WTO criteria. 
In general, these reforms induced reductions in market price supports and output subsidies, and 
increased decoupled subsidies, such as the SFP.  
Figure 1 shows the development of the CAP using OECD PSE data. The PSE consists of 
market price support (MPS) and budgetary transfers that are subdivided into single commodity 
transfer (SCT) payments, group commodity transfer (GCT) payments, all commodity transfer 
(ACT) payments, and other transfers to producers (OTP) payments that comprise the SFP. The 
graph displays only slight variations of domestic support payments in the 1986-2012 period, 
whereas it clearly depicts a change in the composition of the PSE.  
 
Figure 1. Development of the PSE composition of the EU  
Source: Authors  elaboration based on OECD PSE database (OECD 2014) 
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The MPS share of the PSE decreases from more than 90% in 1986 to less than 20% in 2012. 
The share of budgetary transfers rises accordingly. Furthermore, the composition of budgetary 
transfers reveals the changes induced by CAP reforms. Figure 1 presents the increase in prod-
uct-specific (SCT) and group-specific (GCT) domestic support, introduced in 1992 with the 
McSharry reform, which remains coupled to production. The EU initiated the first attempt to-
ward decoupled support with the Agenda 2000 reform, which is shown in the larger shares of 
support allocated to all primary agricultural commodities (ACT) in figure 1. In 2005, the EU 
introduced the SFP (OTP), which was declared to be decoupled from production. The graph 
highlights that decoupled support has increased considerably since 2005, whereas coupled sup-
port has obviously diminished. 
The PSE payments are further subdivided according to subsidy types, such as output, input 
use, land, labor, and capital. Table 1 decomposes the PSE budgetary transfers of the EU25 into 
payment categories and types for the years 2004 and 2007 to identify the development of these 
categories and types. The first column in the years 2004 and 2007 present the values for each 
category (SCT, GCT, ACT, OTP), which are further subdivided into values for each payment 
type. The second column shows the shares of each category of the total PSE and the shares of 
each payment type of the corresponding category. The last column of table 1 depicts changes 
from 2004 to 2007. The total value of PSE budgetary transfers rises by 7% from 2004 to 2007. 
Furthermore, table 1 emphasizes the significant increase in OTP, which accounts for 
1,455 million in 2004 but rises to 31,382 million in 2007. As a result, 53% of the PSE budg-
etary transfers are classified as decoupled from production.  
Additionally, coupled support in the form of product- and group-specific support (SCT, 
GCT) clearly decreases to values that are less than one-third of their 2004 values, whereas the 
less-coupled non-product-specific category ACT increases by approximately 9%. 
In addition, table 1 depicts considerable changes in the allocation of payments within each 
category. The composition of SCT shows a move toward payments based on land and away 
from payments based on output and input use. By contrast, the structure of GCT moves toward 
subsidies allocated according to input and labor use, whereas ACT shifts toward subsidies al-
located according to labor and capital use. Both categories show reduced payments based on 
land. These changes reflect an increase in production incentives through GCT and ACT pay-
ments and a decrease in production effects due to SCT payments. 
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Table 1  million) 
 2004  2007  change 
Budgetary 
transfer  
% share of 
PSE category  
% share of 
PSE category % 
SCT 18,012 33 4,632 8 -74 
Output 243 1 2 0 -99 
Input 5,542 31 922 20 -83 
Land 2,061 11 1,173 25 -43 
Labor - - - - - 
Capital 10,167 56 2,534 55 -75 
GCT 19,331 35 5,529 9 -71 
Output - - - - - 
Input 1,304 7 1,190 22 -9 
Land 17,479 90 3,633 66 -79 
Labor 67 0 768 14 1,046 
Capital 482 2 - - -100 
ACT 15,785 29 17,131 29 9 
Output - - - - - 
Input 4,553 29 4,627 27 2 
Land 7,732 49 6,812 40 -12 
Labor 237 2 481 3 103 
Capital 3,263 21 5,212 30 60 
OTP / SFP 1,455 3 31,382 53 2,057 
PSE excl. MPS 54,583  58,674  7 
Source: OECD PSE tables 2004, 2007(OECD 2014) and own calculations 
Note: Here we allocated the PSE classification of policy instruments according payment types (output, input, land, 
labor, and capital) that are used in GTAP. 
The WTO scheme classifies subsidies coupled to production as AMS support (AoA Article 
6.2) consisting of MPS and non-exempted direct payments (amber box support) or direct pay-
ments meeting the criteria of AoA Article 6.5 (blue box support), depending on the extent to 
which they create production incentives. Decoupled support and other direct payments given to 
  
8 
 
agricultural producers as defined in AoA Annex 2, paras. 5 and 6 are categorized as green box 
support because they are only minimally trade distorting. Figure 2 shows the development of 
domestic support classified according to the WTO scheme from the 1999/2000  2009/2010 
marketing years. This graph highlights the reduction of trade-distorting amber and blue box 
support, and the rise of only minimally trade-distorting green box support. Thus, it reflects the 
movement from market price support schemes to decoupled support schemes. Hence, domestic 
support categorized according to this WTO scheme shows the same changes that can be seen 
in the PSE data from the OECD. Josling and Mittenzwei (2013) provide a reconstruction of 
WTO notification tables using the PSE categories and support types.  
 
Figure 2. Development of EU domestic support according to the WTO classification 
scheme  
Source: Authors  elaboration based on WTO notification tables for domestic support (WTO ; WTO 
2014) 
In addition, Josling and Mittenzwei (2013) analyze and discuss the production requirement 
and the related trade-distorting effects of green box support and conclude that the PSE database 
is not only suited to rebuild but also to improve the policy details of the WTO notification 
tables. Many support programs that fulfill the WTO requirements defined in Article 6 and An-
nex 2 of the AoA imply that there is a need for production. Josling and Mittenzwei (2013), in 
particular, stress the benefit of utilizing both databases regarding the extent to which green box 
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payments require production that is provided by the PSE. Furthermore, they emphasize that the 
two datasets, the OECD PSE tables and the WTO classification scheme, can be regarded as 
complementary resources and use OECD PSE data to build pre-notification tables to overcome 
 
The PSE and the WTO classification scheme are both important measures that monitor 
changes in the composition of countries' agricultural policy instruments and are thus both well 
suited to evaluate such changes. Nevertheless, neither the PSE nor the WTO classification 
scheme enable a quantification of the impact on trade or a comparison with other trade-dis-
torting policy instruments, such as tariffs or export subsidies. 
3 Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Index of domestic support payments 
The MTRI developed by Anderson and Neary (2003; 2005) is a theoretically based index that 
measures import volume-equivalent protection, which is defined as the uniform tariff  that 
results in the same import volume 0 0M p ,b  at world prices  of tariff-restricted imports, such 
as the initial sector-specific tariffs when domestic prices equal p  
nous income b : 
 
(1) 
0 0 0 0 0p ,b : M (1 ) ,b M p ,b  
Following Anderson and Neary (2005), the import volume is given by world market prices 
times net import demand. The exogenous balance-of-payments surplus is assumed to be the 
same during both periods. Anderson and Neary (2005) considered a small open economy that 
produces and consumes 1n  commodities that are traded at exogenous prices with the rest of 
the world. All agents within this economy face the same domestic prices, which differ from 
 
This characteristic of accounting for protection in terms of import equivalences enables the 
MTRI to be an appropriate starting point for the development of our index, which measures the 
distortive effects of domestic support payments. 
In figure 3, we use a small country to illustrate an application of the MTRI approach to 
domestic support. We assume that this net-importing country provides a product-specific output 
subsidy, that the market is not protected by tariffs in the initial situation, and that there are no 
consumer subsidies. Abolishing the output subsidy shifts the auxiliary supply curve 0S  back to 
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the actual supply curve 1S  and decreases the agent's price from 
0
p  to     , which is accompa-
nied by a reduction in the quantity supplied from 0
sq  to q . The world market price for this 
product is not affected. The import demand quantity given by 0 0
d sq q  rises to 
0
d sq q . 
 
Figure 3. Implication of a removal of output subsidies - small country case 
Source: Authors' elaboration  
Note: The initial situation with an output subsidy in place is indicated with superscript 0 whereas the new situation 
after the removal of the output subsidy and the uniform protection rate is indicated with superscript 1. 
Following the MTRI concept, the removal of an output subsidy subject to a constant import 
volume leads to the new market price, , by implementing a uniform tariff, . Both produc-
ers and consumers are faced with new market price , which leads to a decrease 
in quantity supplied, , and demanded, . Because the world market price remains un-
changed due to the small country assumption, the new import volume given by  
equals the initial import volume given by . 
1p
ds
1 1 dsp
1
sq
1
dq
1 1
d sq q
0 0
d sq q
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In the multi-good case, the implemented tariff, ds , reflects the uniform tariff that keeps the 
total import volume of the aggregated commodities constant, as all domestic support payments 
are removed.  
We adapt the theoretical concept of Anderson and Neary (2005) to domestic support by 
quantifying the trade-distortive effect of these subsidies. As shown in figure 3, the idea of ap-
plying the MTRI as a measure of the distortions of domestic support is to remove domestic 
subsidies and quantify a uniform protection rate that keeps trade volume constant. To evaluate 
the trade-restrictiveness of domestic support payments with the help of a theoretically sound 
index, we must consider the effect on both import demand and export supply. Furthermore, 
consumers and producers receive domestic support payments such that the net import demand 
function ,p cm p p  is determined as a function of producer 
pp  and consumer prices 
cp  (An-
derson and Neary 2005). 
 
(2) ,p c c pm p p d p s p   
Assuming that there are no other trade policies in place, the distorted domestic producer price 
is given for commodity i  by 1
p p
i i ip , where 
p
i  
is the rate of producer distortions. 
However, the distorted domestic consumer price is given by 1c ci i ip , where 
c
i
 is the 
rate of consumer distortions.1 If 
p c
i i 0 , there are no distortions. 
The aggregated vector of net imports is given by ,p cM p p : 
 
(3) , ,p c p cM p p m p p  
Thus, the MTRI for domestic support payments (MTRI-DS) ds  is determined through the 
following identity: 
 
                                                 
11 Assuming initial import tariffs in place, e.g., the producer price is given by p p
i i i i
p 1 1 and the con-
sumer price is given by c c
i i i i
p 1 1 , which would affect the height of the uniform protection rate. 
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(4) , : 1 , 1 1 , 1 ,
ds p c ds ds p c p cp p M M M p p  
Following Lloyd and MacLaren (2010), equation (5) represents the change in the value of 
imports from the free-trade situation for a small country.  
 
(5) ' , ' , ' ,p c p c p cM m p p d p p s p p  
Accordingly, the MTRI-DS, ds , is implicitly given by equations (6) and (7), where we 
equate this change with the situation with a uniform protection rate. Hence, the MTRI-DS quan-
tifies the homogeneous protection rate that results in the same change in the import value as the 
initial consumer and producer distortions. 
 
(6) ' , ' 1 , 1 ' 1 , 1p c p c ds dsm p p m m  
In general, because the rate of producer distortion differs from the rate of consumer distor-
tions, it is important to distinguish between consumer and producer distortions. Nevertheless, 
assuming c p  and linear import demand functions implying constant slopes of the demand 
and supply curves, equations (6) and (7) can be solved for ds  to obtain the general equilibrium 
form of the MTRI-DS, based on Lloyd and MacLaren (2010), with commodity 1,....,i n  and 
commodity 1,....,j n , where i j  are complements/substitutes reflecting cross-price effects.  
 
(7) 
i i i i
ds ds
i j i ju u
i j i jds ds
j j j jj j
i j i j
i i i i
c
i j i ji i
i j i jc
j j j j
i j
d d s s
p p p p
d d s s
p p p p
d d s s
p p p p
d d
p p
p
i i
p
j j j j
i j
s s
p p
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The MTRI-DS accounts for cross-price effects on both consumption and production sides 
and considers both producer and consumer distortion rates. Equation (8) shows the general 
equilibrium solution of the MTRI-DS. 
 
(8) ds c pj ij j ij
i j i j
w a v b   
The consumer distortion rate, 
ij
w , and the producer distortion rate, 
ij
v , are expressed by the 
equations (9) and (10) separating own- and cross-price effects. 
 
(9) ij i j i j i j i j
i j
w ( d / p ) ( d / p )   
(10) ij i j i j i j i j
i j
v ( s / p ) ( s / p )   
Equation (8) divides the total import responses into two shares: consumption responses de-
noted by a  and production responses denoted by b  (equations (11) and (12)). These shares 
weight the total production and consumption effects that are given in parentheses in equation 
(8). All weights sum to unity. 
 
(11) i j i j i j i j
i j i j
a d p m p   
(12) i j i j i j i j
i j i j
b s p m p  
In this article, we apply a CGE model to determine the MTRI for domestic support provided 
to agricultural producers. Deviating from the small country approach introduced above, the 
CGE approach allows us to account for effects on world market prices and considers diverging 
consumer and producer distortion rates.  
4 Extended GTAP modeling framework 
The analysis in this article is based upon an extended version of the standard GTAP model 
and updated versions of the underlying GTAP database Version 8.1 that are well documented 
in Hertel (1997) and Narayanan et al. (2012). Following Urban et al. (2014), we update the 
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domestic support payments in the GTAP database to consider the structure of these payments.2 
The application of a complex updating procedure with a modified version of the Altertax pro-
gram (Malcolm 1998) enables us to integrate the PSE data according to the SCT, ACT, GCT, 
and OTP categories and the payment types, i.e., output, input, land, labor and capital. The var-
ious agricultural policy instruments are mirrored in the GTAP model in the form of the five 
intermediate inputs, land, capital, and labor, respectively. We implement additional policy in-
struments to subdivide each of these price wedges according to the four PSE categories to 
achieve a detailed representation of domestic support in the underlying value flows and the 
corresponding price-linkage equations. The SCT payments are linked to a specific product, 
whereas ACT and GCT payments are given to a group of commodities and are therefore allo-
cated with a homogenous rate across the commodities belonging to these product groups. OTP 
payments are not linked to production. Hence, they are distributed at a homogeneous rate across 
primary agricultural commodities according to land utilization (Urban et al. 2014), which re-
flects effectively fully decoupled payments (Cahill 1997).  
The introduction of additional policy instruments enables the relocation of domestic support 
payments in the updated database according to the WTO classification scheme. To achieve this, 
we subdivide each of the newly integrated domestic support price wedges in the GTAP model 
into amber, blue and green box supports, which results in a complex structure of domestic sup-
port payments in the GTAP model and database that represents both important measures of 
domestic support payments, the PSE concept and the WTO classification scheme. 
Modeling the MTRI for domestic support payments builds on an approach developed by 
Antimiani and Salvatici (2005) and Pelikan and Brockmeier (2008a). This approach introduces 
new variables that measure the imported quantity of all commodities by source and destination 
and define the newly implemented quantity variables as exogenous in the model to calculate 
the endogenously adjusted uniform tariff equivalent.  
The GTAP model represents trade through bilateral trade matrices based on the Armington 
assumption (Armington 1969). The elasticity of substitution therefor determines the similarity 
of commodities from different countries to allow all products to be differentiated by country of 
                                                 
2 Market price support is implicitly included in the GTAP model via border measures. To avoid double counting, 
we only incorporated PSE budgetary payments into the GTAP database and model. 
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origin. The import demand is modeled in GTAP using a two-stage nested CES functional form 
(Hertel 1997). Consequently, a country both imports and exports in the same sector.  
To capture the trade-distorting effect of domestic support payments, we must keep track of 
the effect on both import and export flows. Considering this, we introduce the new policy var-
iable "MTRI-DS" in both the market price and export price equations. Adapting the approach 
of Antimiani and Salvatici (2005) and Pelikan and Brockmeier (2008a), we capture domestic 
support by introducing new variables to quantify the trade volume of commodities by source 
and destination by determining the value of net imports in the model. Similar to their approach, 
we define trade volume variables as exogenous such that the adjusting uniform protection rate 
takes the changes on both the import and export sides into account, while we remove domestic 
support subsidies. 
In contrast to the simplified formal approach based on the small country assumption (com-
pare section 3), the general equilibrium environment of the GTAP model allows us to account 
for the effects of removing domestic support on world market prices.  
5 Experiment design 
The GTAP database Version 8.1 includes bilateral trade and protection matrices and addi-
tional data from the OECD PSE tables and links 57 sectors in 129 regions in the year 2007. 
This database is aggregated to the EU and to the Rest of the World and to 22 sectors (compare 
tables A1 and A2 in the appendix). The highly aggregated regional setting is chosen to avoid 
aggregation effects that might lead to a bias in the analysis. The aggregate of the EU consists 
of 25 EU member states. However, Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007. Therefore, 
we have excluded both from the EU aggregate to allow consistent comparison of the regional 
aggregation and the PSE tables of the EU in the years 2004 and 2007. 
Decoupled payments are controversially discussed in the literature. Important issues include 
capitalization of direct payments in land rents as well as various coupling channels through 
which a farmer's production decision might be influenced (Bhaskar and Beghin 2009; Goodwin 
and Mishra 2005; Key and Roberts 2009; Latruffe and Le Mouel 2009). However, the extent to 
which this incentive occurs remains unclear, and we thus choose to follow Urban et al. (2014) 
in our analysis.  
We create a set of deviating GTAP databases to enable our evaluation of domestic support 
development (table 2). Therefore, we implement domestic support payments originating from 
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OECD PSE tables for 2004 and 2007 (OECD 2014) in the GTAP database (version 8.1, base 
year, 2007). In so doing, we vary the assumptions regarding the degree of decoupling of the 
SFP. The first (PSE04-SFPland100) and second (PSE07-SFPland100) database represent a full 
capitalization of the SFP in land rents, whereby the SFP is allocated with a homogeneous rate 
across primary agricultural commodities to land. In the first database (PSE04-SFPland100), we 
integrate the levels of domestic support from the PSE tables of 2004 into Version 8.1, base year 
2007, of the GTAP database. 
Table 2: Database Setting 
 
Name of the database 
 
 
PSE04-
SFPland100 
PSE07-
SFPland100 
PSE07-
SFPland90 
PSE07-
SFPland80 
Baseyear 
PSE table 
2004 X    
2007  X X X 
SFP 
allocation 
Land 100% 100% 
Land usage + 
90% of la-
bor, capital 
usage 
Land usage + 
80% of la-
bor, capital 
usage 
Labor, 
capital 
  
10% of fac-
tor usage 
20% of fac-
tor usage 
Effect on  
production 
Fully 
decoupled 
X X   
Partially 
decoupled 
  X X 
Source: Authors  elaboration 
This procedure allows us to compare domestic support over different years but does not 
create a bias through deviating parameters in different base years, such as changing trade pro-
tection data would, for example. For the third database (PSE07-SFPland90), we assume that 
the SFP is not fully capitalized in land rents but nonetheless creates production incentives 
through other coupling channels. Here, we begin from an allocation of the SFP according to 
  
17 
 
factor usage and shift 90% of the SFP initially distributed to labor and capital onto land. This 
seems appropriate because Goodwin and Mishra (2005), for example, state that the effect of 
other coupling channels is rather modest. In the fourth database (PSE07-SFPland80), we ac-
count for a lower degree of decoupling, as in PSE07_SFPland90, and shift only 80% to land.  
We use the four databases as starting points to run the scenarios summarized in table 3. The 
database PSE07-SFPland100 is applied to first run a simulation that completely removes do-
mestic support payments given to primary agricultural commodities. This scenario serves as a 
benchmark to evaluate the effectiveness of the extended MTRI at capturing the effects and 
restrictiveness of domestic support payments. Second, three scenarios (table 3) are simulated to 
either eliminate domestic support, import tariffs or export subsidies and to determine the uni-
form equivalent protection rate. The remaining three databases are used to determine the MTRI-
DS, applying scenario DS UPR 
Table 3. Overview of Applied Scenarios 
  Name of scenario 
  DS-UPR TMS-UPR TXS-UPR 
Abolishment of: 
Domestic support 
payments 
X   
Import tariffs  X  
Export subsidies   X 
UPR included in: 
Market price  
equation 
X X  
Export price  
equation 
X  X 
UPR: 
Swapped with  
net-imports 
X X X 
Source: Authors  elaboration 
Note: UPR stands for uniform protection rate 
Finally, to validate the concept of the MTRI-DS, in particular the effects of domestic support 
payments on downstream sectors of the value chain, we calculate the MTRI-DS not only for a 
specific sector but also for aggregated primary and downstream sectors. In so doing, we analyze 
how different commodity aggregations affect the index number and the allocation effects in the 
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EU due to removal of subsidies. We begin with eliminating domestic support payments given 
to all primary agricultural commodities, while we determine the uniform protection equivalent 
first for primary agricultural commodities and second for all food commodities to account for 
effects along the value chain.  
6 Results 
Abolishing EU domestic support payments causes the well-known effect of a decrease in output 
and exports, while imports and the world market price increase (compare table A3 in the ap-
pendix). Although the trade-distorting effect of EU domestic support is obvious, we are not able 
to identify the overall level of trade restrictiveness of these policy instruments used for domestic 
support. Therefore, we describe in the following subsections the results of our applied MTRI-
DS in the GTAP model.  
6.1 MTRI-DS compared with border measures 
We utilize the three scenarios (DS-UPR, TMS-UPR und TXS-UPR) described in table 3 to 
assess this issue. Following the defined scenarios, we compare the results of completely remov-
ing domestic support, import tariffs, or export subsidies for primary agricultural commodities 
utilizing database PSE07-SFPland100 in table 4. In the first column of the table, we present the 
uniform equivalent protection for removing domestic subsidies and the decomposition of the 
overall change in the MTRI-DS by primary agricultural commodities. The second and third 
columns show the uniform protection rate and the decomposition for the removal of import 
tariffs and exports subsidies, respectively.  
Three points are notable. First, the MTRI-DS equals a uniform protection rate of 3.66, com-
pared with 2.98 for import tariffs and only 0.29 for export subsidies, which indicates that do-
mestic support payments are more trade restrictive than are import tariffs and export subsidies. 
Second, the decomposition reveals that the MTRI-DS is mainly driven by removing domestic 
support payments given to other crops, followed by fruits and vegetables; however, with respect 
to removing import tariffs, the fruits and vegetables sector contributes the most to the MTRI-
DS. 
Third, table 4 clearly shows that import tariffs are more trade restrictive in arable crops than 
domestic support payments, whereas domestic support payments are more trade distorting in 
the oilseeds and other crops sectors. Domestic support payments and import tariffs show almost 
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the same level of trade restrictiveness only in the fruits and vegetables sector. Thus, the impact 
on trade caused by the applied protection instruments varies significantly between sectors. 
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Table 4. Comparison of the MTRI-DS with other Border Measures 
 Removal of:   
 Domestic  
support  
Import tariffs  
Export  
subsidies  
MTRI-DS / UPR for primary 
agricultural commodities 3.66 2.98 0.29 
Decomposition of results:    
All crops:    
Arable crops 0.56 0.75 0.00 
Oilseeds 0.13 0.00 0.00 
Other crops 2.42 0.50 0.00 
Fruits and vegetables 1.68 1.62 0.11 
Livestock:    
Ruminants -0.66 0.04 0.18 
Non-ruminants -0.46 0.07 0.00 
 
Note: GTAP Version 8.1 adapted to PSE07-SFPland100 as described in table 2. Compare table A 4 to A 5 in the 
appendix for the effect of the elasticity of substitution and the underlying protection data on the MTRI of domestic 
distortion. For the representation of the results, we aggregated the primary agricultural sectors as shown in the 
table. The arable crops aggregate comprises paddy rise, wheat, cereal grains as corn, barley, rye, oats, sugar cane 
and sugar beet, and plant-based fibers. The Oilseed sector includes oil seed and oleaginous fruits, soybeans and 
copra. Aggregated other crops considers other crops as live plants, cut flowers, beverage and spice crops, tobacco, 
seeds, protein crops as clover, lupines, and alfalfa, fodder and forage products. The fruits and vegetables sector 
contains vegetables, fruits, nuts, potatoes, cassava, and truffles. The ruminants sector includes cattle, sheep, goats, 
horses, and raw milk and wool whereas the non-ruminants sector consists of other animal products as swine, poul-
try, other live animals, and eggs. 
6.2 Development of the MTRI-DS 
How does implementing decoupled support affect the results? In table 5, we compare the effects 
of the deviating GTAP databases (columns 1 to 4) regarding distribution of the SFP for base 
year 2007 (compare table 2). Furthermore, table 5 decomposes the results according to the ef-
fects of payment categories, payment types, different sectors, and the WTO classification 
scheme on the uniform protection equivalent. 
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Table 5. Development of the MTRI-DS for Agricultural Commodities and its Components 
  
PSE04- 
SFP-
land100 
PSE07- 
SFP-
land100 
PSE07- 
SFP-
land90 
PSE07- 
SFP-
land80 
1. MTRI-DS  3.42 3.66 4.64 5.62 
2. Payment category:     
 Single commodity transfer (SCT) 2.38 0.75 0.76 0.76 
 Group commodity transfer GCT) -0.65 0.30 0.30 0.30 
 All commodity transfer (ACT) 1.68 2.59 2.60 2.61 
 Other transfer to producers (OTP /SFP) 0.00 0.02 0.99 1.95 
3. Payment type:     
 Output 1.73 0.39 0.39 0.39 
 Input 0.74 0.70 0.70 0.69 
 Land -0.72 0.28 0.28 0.28 
 Labor 0.10 0.18 0.95 1.72 
 Capital 1.58 2.11 2.32 2.54 
4. Primary agricultural commodities:   
 Arable crops -0.70 0.56 0.74 0.93 
 Oilseeds 0.94 0.13 0.23 0.23 
 Other crops 1.96 2.42 2.79 3.15 
 Fruits and vegetables 0.98 1.68 1.96 2.25 
 Ruminants 0.26 -0.66 -0.61 -0.55 
 Non-ruminants -0.02 -0.46 -0.42 -0.38 
5. WTO box classification:     
 Amber box 2.31 0.79 0.78 0.78 
 Blue box -0.60 0.26 0.26 0.26 
 Green Box 1.71 2.61 3.59 4.57 
 
Note: GTAP version 8.1, base year 2007. 
The MTRI-DS shows a slight increase of 7% from 3.42 in 2004 to 3.66 in 2007 based on 
in MTRI-DS from 2004 to 2007 would be expected to reflect the higher share of decoupled 
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support in 2007 because the CAP introduced the SFP in 2005, accounting for 53% (3%) of 
domestic support payments in 2007 (2004).  
As anticipated, the decrease in the degree of decoupling (columns 2 to 4) leads to a rise in 
the MTRI-DS. The integration of the SFP as effectively fully decoupled payments into the 
model results in the smallest uniform protection rate, whereas databases considering the SFP as 
only partially decoupled show a MTRI-DS that is increasing from database PSE07-SFPland90 
to PSE07-SFPland80, which corresponds to an increasing degree of coupling. Thus, the MTRI-
DS reflects the impact on trade restrictiveness of deviating underlying assumptions about the 
SFP.  
The second and third part of table 5 presents the MTRI-DS differentiated into categories and 
types of support. This depiction indicates that the SFP has no effect on the MTRI-DS when 
payments are modeled with a homogeneous rate across commodities allocated to land. 
This decomposition shows that SCT and ACT payments govern the uniform equivalent pro-
tection rate. SCT comprises product-specific subsidies and therefore obviously affects produc-
tion decisions. The effect of the SCT on the MTRI-DS declines from 2.38 (2004) to 0.75 (2007) 
because of the reduction in SCT payments 
sition of the SCT away from subsidies based on output or input use strengthens this effect 
(compare table 1).  
6.3 Impact of the payment category and payment type on the MTRI-DS 
The composition of ACT payments explains the impact on the MTRI-DS. In 2004, only 49% 
of ACT payments are allocated to land. Payments to land are expected to have the least effect 
on production, particularly when distributed at a homogeneous rate across all primary agricul-
tural commodities. Furthermore, the contribution of ACT payments to the MTRI-DS rises from 
1.68 (2004) to 2.59 (2007) due to reduced payments allocated to land in favor of payments 
distributed to labor and capital. 
In contrast to ACT, GCT is provided in the form of group-specific subsidies; hence, GCT 
may create higher production incentives. Table 5 displays contrasting effects on the MTRI-DS 
in 2004 compared with 2007. In 2004, contribution to the MTRI-DS is negative, whereas it is 
positive in 2007, although the share of GCT payments shrinks considerably. In 2004, 90% of 
GCT payments are provided as subsidies based on land. Additionally, the homogeneous distri-
bution across groups of commodities harms all commodities equally and does not boost factor 
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re-allocation. Consequently, reducing those payments affects production decisions less than 
SCT and ACT payments affect such decisions. Furthermore, GCT subsidies based on land sub-
stantially decrease in 2007 whereas the distribution to labor clearly increases, which explains 
the reverse effect (0.3) on the MTRI-DS.  
Payment types affect the MTRI-DS differently. Output subsidies apparently create produc-
tion incentives shown by the highest contribution to the MTRI-DS in 2004 (1.73). The substan-
tial removal of output subsidies until 2007 explains the reduced contribution in 2007. The de-
termined effect for intermediate inputs is almost the same in 2004 as in 2007. According to the 
PSE tables, product-specific input subsidies are reduced considerably, followed by moderate 
decreases of input subsidies in the GCT category and only a slight reduction in the ACT cate-
gory. However, the contribution of intermediate inputs to the overall MTRI-DS diminishes only 
slightly. Payments given to capital largely decrease, whereas the effect on the MTRI-DS in-
creases. These results support the conclusion that payment types other than land have become 
more important. 
6.4 Decomposition of the MTRI-DS according to sectoral contributions 
The fourth part of table 5 shows a decomposition of the overall change in the MTRI-DS ac-
cording to sectoral contribution. Clearly, the other crops sector has the greatest effect on the 
MTRI-DS. Its importance even increases from 2004 to 2007 due to a rise in domestic support 
payments involving growth of capital- and labor-based payments that exceed the decreases in 
output subsidies. However, the sector for fruits and vegetables also reveals a significant effect 
on the MTRI-DS that increases considerably from 0.98 to 1.68. Domestic support in this sector 
is three times as high in 2007 as in 2004, which explains the increase, particularly because 
payments based on output, capital, and labor rise. The effects of the arable crop sector also 
grow, although the total amount of subsidies declines from  to 
lion.3 However, in 2004, the decomposition reports a negative number for arable crops. A neg-
ative contribution to the MTRI-DS implies that an import subsidy, export tax or a combination 
of these policy instruments is required to keep the volume of net imports constant. In 2004, 
96% of the subsidies for arable crops are allocated based on land and only 0.1% are output 
                                                 
3 Table 1 shows the aggregated PSE values according to payment categories and types. Sector-specific PSE values 
are not presented in this article.  
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subsidies. Furthermore, no more than 8% are product-specific subsidies. Removing these sub-
sidies would imply a decrease in the value of exports that is less than the increase in the value 
of imports. Consequently, an import subsidy, an export tax or a combination of these policy 
instruments is required to keep net trade volume constant. In 2007, the share of payments allo-
cated based on land clearly decreased, thereby necessitating an import tariff, an export subsidy 
or a combination of these policy instruments to fix the net trade volume by inducing a positive 
MTRI-DS.  
By contrast, the contribution of oilseeds decreases from 0.94 in 2004 to only 0.13 in 2007 
due to a decrease of domestic support of -50%; in particular, product-specific subsidies allo-
cated on output are lowered. Additionally, the livestock sectors, in particular, show reduced 
trade restrictiveness. In 2007, both the ruminants and non-ruminants sectors even display a 
negative contribution to the uniform protection rate. The results for the sector of cattle, goats, 
sheep and horses demonstrate that this sector is highly subsidized. In 2004, 82% of domestic 
support is distributed-product specific, of which 98% is allocated based on capital. This result 
supports our assumption that this sector is highly trade restrictive. Nevertheless, removing do-
mestic support leads to a decrease in export values that exceeds the increase in import values, 
which yields a negative MTRI-DS and implies the need for an import subsidy, an export tax or 
a combination of these policy instruments to maintain an unchanged net import volume. We 
observe such a discrepancy because the import volume of the downstream sectors, such as meat 
products, substantially increased. 
6.5 Aggregation effects on the MTRI-DS 
Table 6 emphasizes the impact of sectoral aggregation on the MTRI-DS. The first column 
shows the effects explained in the previous sections, whereas the second column illustrates the 
uniform protection rate that is necessary to keep the net import volume of all food commodities 
constant to account for forward linkages. This net import equivalent clearly varies depending 
on the aggregation. The deviations are induced by changes in the downstream sectors because 
the removal of domestic support leads to higher input prices. In so doing, eliminating subsidies 
given to the livestock sector results in reduced output, higher market prices and, consequently, 
decreased exports and increased imports.  
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Thus, downstream sectors, such as meat products, are faced with higher input prices that 
cause market prices for meat products to rise and results in increased meat imports and reduc-
tions in the livestock inputs used in the meat industry. Consequently, a simulation that also 
retains the import volume of the forward-linked sectors yields an MTRI-DS for livestock that 
is positive; therefore, the trade restrictiveness of subsidies given to livestock producers is nota-
ble. 
Table 6. Impact of the Sectoral Aggregation on the MTRI-DS in 2007 
 
Primary agricultural 
commodities 
Food commodities 
MTRI-DS 3.66 1.97 
Decomposition of results:   
All crops:   
Arable crops 0.56 0.04 
Oilseeds 0.13 0.46 
Other crops 2.42 0.64 
Fruits and vegetables 1.68 0.33 
Livestock:   
Ruminants -0.66 0.40 
Non-ruminants -0.46 0.11 
Source: Authors  calculation 
Note: GTAP Version 8.1 adapted to PSE07-SFPland100 as described in Table 2. 
6.6 Decomposition of the MTRI-DS according to the WTO classification scheme 
The last part of table 5 shows the results of the reconciliation of PSE data with the WTO clas-
sification scheme. Here, the achievement of the CAP reform in lowering the trade-distortive 
effects of domestic support is evident. In our representation, the amber box comprises only non-
exempt direct payments. The highly trade-distortive amber box support decreases substantially 
from 2004 to 2007, which is reflected in a decline of the contribution to the MTRI-DS from 
2.31 to 0.79. Furthermore, the EU cut payments classified as blue box support. However, in 
table 5 the contribution of blue box support to the overall MTRI-DS changes from -0.6 to 0.26. 
The effect of the removal of domestic support on forward linkages as described for the livestock 
  
26 
 
and meat sector in the previous paragraph explains this result. The trade-distortive effect of 
green box support increases from 1.71 to 2.61. Our application of the MTRI-DS reveals that 
payments assigned to the green box other than the SFP have a clear effect on trade. In 2004, the 
green box includes 32% of the PSE budgetary transfers, of which 9% are SFP, whereas in 2007, 
the green box increases to 84% of the PSE budgetary transfers and 66% of these are now SFP. 
Non-SFP green box support based on the PSE increased by more than 6% from 2004 to 2007. 
Green box payments other than SFP are modeled in GTAP by their PSE category, and the PSE 
concept distinguishes policy instruments according to their production requirement. ACT con-
tains most of the non-SFP green box payments. Only half of these payments are distributed to 
land whereas the other half is provided as mainly capital, labor and input subsidies. They attract 
more capital, labor and intermediate inputs to be employed in the agricultural sector and are 
trade distorting, as a consequence. The rise from 2004 to 2007 can therefore be traced back to 
substantial growth of green box payments allocated to output, capital, and labor. 
7 Discussion and conclusion 
The objective of this article is to provide a theoretically sound index that enables the evaluation 
of the trade restrictiveness of domestic support payments and the application of this index in a 
CGE framework. Specifically, we build on the work of Anderson and Neary (2005) to derive 
an index based on their MTRI. We name our index MTRI-DS and implement it in the GTAP 
framework. The adopted model is an extended version of the GTAP framework that considers 
domestic support payments in detail and includes a reconciled representation of two important 
measures of domestic support payments: the PSE concept and the WTO classification scheme. 
We employ this framework to determine the tariff equivalent of EU domestic support payments 
while accounting for the general equilibrium effects, including all intersectoral linkages and 
interdependencies with world markets.  
This tariff equivalent of domestic support payments is appropriate for comparing different 
protection policies, such as import tariffs, export subsidies, and domestic support payments. 
The simulation results reveal that domestic support payments in the EU (3.66) are more trade 
restrictive than import tariffs (2.98) or export subsidies (0.29). Hence, our new MTRI-DS al-
lows a rating of the trade-distortive effect of different protection instruments based on quanti-
tative results. Furthermore, the resulting uniform protection rate demonstrates the development 
of domestic support payments in the EU over time, including the effect of the implementation 
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of decoupled support. Our MTRI-DS tracks changes in the composition of CAP policy instru-
ments and is therefore suited to assess the effect of policy reforms. Additionally, our MTRI-DS 
allows evaluation of policy reforms with respect to their contribution to meeting WTO require-
ments. In other words, the MTRI-
time, indicating a movement toward less-distortive policy instruments, and is therefore suited 
to support trade negotiations. Finally, the MTRI-DS figures are meaningful for comparisons 
across countries.   
Our MTRI is thus useful for policy analysis in which the relevancies of different policy 
instruments are considered and compared, such as in simulations to analyze WTO negotiations, 
which requires a comparison of the trade restrictiveness of domestic support payments, other 
protection instruments for market access, and export subsidies.  
Although this index already operates as an effective tool for analyzing domestic support 
payments, it also provides a springboard for further research. The PSE concept classifies do-
mestic support payments according to production requirements and thus results in a higher 
trade-distortive effect than does green box support under the WTO framework. Our current 
method of incorporating non-SFP green box payments based on the PSE into the GTAP model 
is clearly trade distorting and might, as a result, overestimate the effect on trade. De Gorter, 
Ingko and Nash (2004), however, refer to the definition of trade-distorting measures in the AoA, 
noting that not all policy instruments are appropriately categorized by their production require-
ments, which leads to underemphasized green box support. Consequently, delving deeper into 
the definition and quantification of trade-distorting measures would help to reveal whether our 
representation of non-SFP green box support correctly reproduces the non-SFP green box in 
terms of distortions.  
Second, aggregation bias can change the results and might, therefore, cause an over- or un-
derestimation of the trade restrictiveness of domestic support payments. In fact, in our analysis, 
we detect such an aggregation bias. The results clearly demonstrate that the MTRI-DS is af-
fected by the inclusion of forward-linked sectors. Therefore, focusing future research on ana-
lyzing the effect of sectoral aggregation on the MTRI-DS would lead to improvements in the 
validation of results.  
In the CGE application, we shift the focus toward producer subsidies, ignoring the potential 
implications of changes in consumer subsidies, although we theoretically derive the MTRI-DS 
from the import volume function, depending on consumer and producer prices. This derivation 
is based on the theoretical approach of Anderson and Neary (2005) and Lloyd and MacLaren 
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(2010). The reason to exclude consumer subsidies is the modeling of households as one repre-
sentative household in the GTAP model, which makes the model inappropriate for analyzing 
the effects of consumer support. This exclusion provides another interesting avenue for future 
research, as embedding consumer subsidies into the analysis would afford the model more ap-
plicability.  
The focus of the MTRI approach and subsequently our MTRI-DS is on foreign trade, 
whereas the implications for welfare and other effects within a country are not covered. Elimi-
nating domestic support reduces government spending whereas introducing the uniform tariff 
rate creates additional tax revenue in our application. Thus, this forces the question of how 
much this increase in government income affects production, consumption, and welfare. Elab-
orating a comparison of our MTRI-DS and the TRI of domestic distortion (Anderson and Neary, 
2005) following the GTAP application of Salvatici (2001) for the EU would therefore complete 
the assessment of the impact of domestic support payments. 
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9 Appendix 
Table A 1. Regional Aggregation of the GTAP Database 
Countries and Regions Abbreviation 
1 EU: EU25 
 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, United King-
dom, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Czech 
Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania 
 
2 Rest of the World: ROW 
 
United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Bulgaria, Romania, Swit-
zerland, Norway, Rest of EFTA, Albania, Croatia, China, India, Brazil, Argen-
tina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Panama, Rest of South America, Rest of Oceania, Rest of  Caribbean, Mauritius, 
Zimbabwe, Botswana, South Africa, Hong Kong, Korea, Rest of East Asia, Indo-
nesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet Nam, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Mexico, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Rest of Central America, Belarus, 
Rest of Eastern Europe, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, Rest of Western 
Asia, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Rest of North Africa, Rest of South African CU, 
Asia, Bangladesh, Rest of South Asia, Nigeria, Senegal, Rest of Western Africa, 
Rest of Central Africa, Rest of South Central Africa, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Ma-
lawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Other Eastern Africa, Taiwan, 
Rest of North America, Russian Federation, Rest of Europe, Kazakhstan, Rest of 
FSU, Azerbaijan, Iran Islamic Republic, Ukraine, Mongolia, Nepal, Honduras, El 
Salvador, Bahrein, Israel, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab. 
Emirates, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Kenia, 
Rwanda, Namibia 
 
Source: Authors  elaboration  
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Table A 2 Sectoral Aggregation of the GTAP Database 
Sectors Abbreviation 
1 Paddy rice pdr 
2 Wheat wht 
3 Cereal grains nec gro 
4 Vegetables, fruits, nuts v_f 
5 Oilseeds osd 
6 Sugar cane, sugar beet c_b 
7 Plant-based fibres pfb 
8 Crops nec ocr 
9 Cattle, sheep, goats, horses ctl 
10 Animal products nec oap 
11 Raw milk rmk 
12 Wool, silk worm cocoons wol 
13 Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, hoarses cmt 
14 Meat products nec omt 
15 Vegetable oils and fats vol 
16 Dairy products mil 
17 Processed rice pcr 
18 Sugar sgr 
19 Other food ofd 
20 Beverages and tobacco products b_t 
21 Manufacturing: Mnfc 
 
Coal, oil, gas, petroleum, coal products, Forestry, fishing, minerals, Textiles, 
wearing apparel, leather products, wood products, paper products, publish-
ing, chemical, rubber, plastic prods, mineral products nec, ferrous metals, 
metals nec, metal products, motor vehicles and parts, transport equipment, 
electronic equipment, machinery and equipment, manufactures nec  
22 Services: Services 
 
Water, construction, trade, transport nec, sea transport, air transport, com-
munication, financial services nec, insurance, business services nec, recrea-
tion and other services, PubAdmin/Defence/Health/Educat, dwellings 
 
Source: Authors  elaboration  
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Table A 3. Effects of an Elimination of Domestic Support Payments in the EU 
 
Output 
EU  
imports 
EU 
exports 
Domestic 
prices 
World mar-
ket prices 
pdr -21.85 52.37 -64.78 12.53 0.71 
wht -3.68 24.15 -21.11 3.70 1.24 
gro -1.82 5.25 -6.52 3.40 0.85 
v_f -2.16 5.73 -6.64 2.91 0.77 
osd -3.71 4.80 -9.58 2.95 0.84 
c_b -0.15 3.79 -3.90 1.41 0.56 
pfb -20.35 26.20 -51.35 17.25 0.91 
ocr -2.40 8.77 -10.29 2.74 1.35 
ctl -4.21 38.30 -29.04 10.92 2.31 
oap -1.58 4.31 -5.21 2.98 0.84 
rmk -0.70 5.39 -19.10 3.48 1.14 
wol -16.90 2.65 -18.90 2.16 0.43 
cmt -4.81 22.74 -22.55 4.18 0.94 
omt -1.58 10.82 -9.74 1.73 0.78 
vol -2.43 3.63 -5.80 1.36 0.47 
mil -0.67 4.27 -3.70 0.96 0.59 
pcr -1.99 5.50 -7.12 2.09 0.46 
sgr -0.21 -0.20 0.00 0.29 0.28 
ofd -0.49 0.73 -0.99 0.57 0.35 
b_t -0.22 0.31 -0.39 0.45 0.31 
Mnfc 0.20 -0.33 0.47 0.07 0.13 
Services 0.04 -0.22 0.28 0.06 0.13 
 calculation  
  
35 
 
Table A 4. Effect of the Initial Protection on the Results of the MTRI-DS 
Protection reduced by  default increased by 
 100% 50%  50% 100% 
Primary agricultural com-
modities 
3.51 3.59 3.66 3.71 3.73 
All crops:      
Arable crops 0.72 0.64 0.56 0.47 0.37 
Oilseeds 0.06 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.20 
Other crops 2.17 2.30 2.42 2.53 2.63 
Fruits and vegetables 1.68 1.68 1.68 1.67 1.65 
Lifestock:      
Ruminants -0.66 -0.66 -0.66 -0.66 -0.66 
Non-ruminants -0.46 -0.47 -0.46 -0.46 -0.46 
Source:  calculation 
Note: GTAP Version 8.1, base year 2007, PSE 2007, SFP allocated 100% to land. In addition, the validation of 
results requires an analysis of the implications of changes in the underlying border protection, because of the 
modeling of the MTRI-DS. We implement the MTRI-DS in the price linkage equations for exports and imports. 
In the price linkage equation for imports (13) the market price is determined.  
 
(13) 1 1 ds
m i cif
p p  
The multiplication of the specific tariff rate 1
i
with the uniform protection rate 1 ds might lead to an effect 
of the initial tariff rate on the MTRI-DS. Hence, we conduct a second sensitivity analysis where import tariffs and 
export subsidies are decreased (increased) for all traded commodities by 50% and 100% to validate the impact of 
varying initial protection data. This analysis reveals that the impact on results is rather modest. 
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Table A 5. Effect of the Elasticity of Substitution on the Results of the MTRI-DS 
Elasticity of substitution Reduced by 
50% default 
Increased by 
50% 
esubm = 
esubd 
Primary agricultural commodi-
ties 3.70 3.66 3.54 3.70 
All crops:     
Arable crops 0.55 0.56 0.53 0.47 
Oilseeds 0.24 0.13 0.05 0.25 
Other crops 2.55 2.42 2.35 2.58 
Fruits and vegetables 1.64 1.68 1.71 1.55 
Lifestock:     
Ruminants -0.71 -0.66 -0.66 -0.68 
Non-ruminants -0.56 -0.46 -0.44 -0.47 
 calculation 
Note: GTAP Version 8.1, base year 2007, PSE 2007, SFP allocated 100% to land. Applying the concept of the 
MTRI-DS in a CGE framework, we are concerned about the Armington assumption. Therefore, we conduct a 
sensitivity analysis to assess the effect of the elasticity of substitution on the MTRI-DS. We distinguish between 
two cases in this sensitivity analysis. First, the nested case, where the elasticity of substitution among sources of 
imports (ESUBM) is equal to two times the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported goods 
(ESUBD), which is the default option in the standard GTAP model. We increase (decrease) the elasticity of sub-
stitution for 50% in this nested structure. Second, we assume a non-nested case, where ESUBM is equal to ESUBD 
(Francois and Reinert 1997). The results confirm minor impact for most of the commodities, although the direction 
varies between sectors. Oilseeds are much more sensible than other commodities.  
 
